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COMMENTS
of the law.'5 The United States Supreme Court, moreover, has
left the door open for the consideration of charges of discrimina-
tion that fall without the race and color category.16 These con-
siderations would appear to be grounds for an argument that,
with the rule of exclusion now the law, it should be extended to
cover other social groups subject to possible discrimination.
Pointing in the same direction are the indications given by the
federal courts in their construction of the federal naturalization
statutes that a Mexican is in a different racial classification from
that of the white man.' 7 If such is the case, then the position of
the defendant in the principal case and that of the Negro in
Norris v. Alabama are closely analogous.
These factors are grounds for questioning the court's refusal
in the principal case to extend the rule of the Norris case beyond
its precise facts. There seems to be little reason why that rule
should not be available to members of races, nationalities, or
other social groups whose standing in a particular case is very
similar to that of the Negro.
COURTS - OPERATION OF OVERRULING DECISIONS
Plaintiff purchased a truck at a stated cash price of $1,750,
giving in payment a note for $1,439.14, cash in the amount of
$100, and his car in trade valued at $500. The increase of $289.14
above the stated cash price was to be for insurance, interest and
service charges. The seller assigned the conditional sales con-
tract, made upon the forms of the defendant, to the defendant
for $1,150. The insurance was $148.24, leaving $140.90 as in-
terest and service charges. The plaintiff filed suit alleging usury
15. Mamaux v. United States, 264 Fed. 816 (6th Cir. 1920) (wage-
earners) ; State v. Walters, 61 Idaho 341, 102 P.2d 284 (1940) (one-quarter
blood Indian); State v. Guirlando, 152 La. 570, 93 So. 796 (1922) (Italian) ;
Sanchez v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 436, 181 S.W.2d 87 (1944) (Mexican);
Carrasco v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. 659, 95 S.W.2d 433 (1936) (Mexican);
Ramirez v. State, 119 Tex. Crim. 362, 40 S.W.2d 138, cert. denied, 284 U.S.
659 (1931) (Mexican). The same indication was given in the principal case.
16. In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 283, r'ehearing denied, 332 U.S.
784 (1947), the Court said:
We do not mean that no case of discrimination in jury drawing
except those involving race or color can carry such unjust consequences
as to amount to a denial of equal protection or due process of law.
17. Ex parte Shahid, 205 Fed. 812 (E.D.S.C. 1913); In Te Rodriguez,
81 Fed. 337 (N.D. Tex. 1897).
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under the constitution' and statutes2 of the state, which allowed
a return of 10 per cent on the use of money. The trial court
found for the defendant. On appeal, held: affirmed. Although the
$149.90 was in effect interest at the rate of 11 per cent, the
contract could not be upset because a long line of decisions had.
allowed such rates in similar fact situations. The court, however,
recognized that the decisions erroneously interpreted the pro-
visions against usury and issued a caveat overruling the old line
of decisions and giving notice that under the new interpretation
such contracts would be illegal.3
The problem raised in this case is how a court, finding that its
past decisions have established an erroneous interpretation of the
law, and that contract rights have been based on that interpreta-
tion, can overrule the old cases without upsetting established
contract rights.4 Our present legal system is primarily based
upon the "declaratory theory" of jurisprudence,5 which states
that court decisions are merely evidence of the law and are not
law themselves. This necessarily means that when a prior de-
cision is overruled, it never was true evidence of the law and that
the rule presently declared is the true rule and always has been.7
1. ARK. CONST. ART. 19, § 13 (1874).
2. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-609 (1947).
3. Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 249 ,S.W.2d 973 (Ark. 1952).
4. See Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions 35 ILL
L. REv. 121 (1940); Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Iast Re:
sort, 37 HARV. L. Rav. 409 (1924).
5. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 64 (4th ed. 1713); Holdsworth,
Case Law, 50 L. Q. REV. 180, 184 (1934). For an excellent case discussion
of this theory, see People ex rel. Rice v. Graves, 242 App. Div. 128, 273 N. Y.
Supp. 582 (3rd Dep't 1934), aff'd, 270 N.Y. 498, 200 N.E. 288 (1936), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 683 (1936).
The doctrine of stare decisis, which calls for a court of equal or lowerjurisdiction to follow the decision of a court of equal or higher jurisdiction,
is another factor that works against the overruling of a particular case.
The doctrine has not, however, been slavishly applied, and courts, through
the exercise of their own discretion have deviated from past decisions and
established new precedents when they have felt that the situation demanded
it. Von Moschzisker, supra note 4, at 412.
Other factors that have influenced the courts in this class of cases are
whether the interpretation has been based on common law, statute, or con-
stitutional provision, whether the old rule has been supported by a long
line of decisions or only one or two decisions, whether the rights involved
have been property or contracts or whether they have been of some other
te, and whether or not the party has actually relied upon the past de-
cisions.
6. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 18 '(U.S. 1842) ; People ex rel. Rice v. Graves,
242 App. Div. 128, 131, 273 N.Y. Supp. 582, 587 (3rd Dep't 1934), aff'd,
270 N.Y. 498, 200 N.E. 288 (1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 683 (1935); Ray
v. West Penna. Natural Gas Co., 138 Pa. 576, 590, 28 Atl. 1065, 1066 (1891).
7. Ibid.
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Thus an overruling decision relates back to the time of the over-
ruled case, and rights arising between the decisions and based
upon the old one become questionable.
Some authorities have attacked this theory as archaic and un-
realistic." These writers suggest that it should be recognized that
the courts do, in fact, make law just as much as the legislature
does and that therefore court decisions, like legislation, should
have only a prospective effect.
This theory has never been generally recognized, as it is funda-
mentally repugnant to the doctrine of separation of powers.
Nevertheless, several United States Supreme Court decisions, in
factual situations analogous to that of the principle case, have
achieved the same result indirectly. Ordinarily the Court follows
the latest interpretation of a state constitution by the highest
court of the state, but to this rule there are several exceptions, 9
one of which is the so-called contract exception to retroactive
overruling.1- Under the contract exception, when a state court
has put two different interpretations on a statutory or constitu-
tional clause, the latest of which has impaired contracts based on
the old interpretation, and the case has come on appeal from a
federal court, the Supreme Court has applied the line of decisions
upon which the contracts had been based and has treated the
8. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 218-240 (2d ed. 1921);
HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 66 (12th ed. 1917); Note, 24 CORNELL L. Q. 611,
612 (1939).
9. For a discussion of these exceptions, see SIMKINS, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§§ 1134, 1137 (3rd ed. 1938). The principal case speaks of the prior decisions
on such sales contracts as setting up a rule of property, but in a stricter
sense the "rule of property" exception is exemplified where a court, on
realizing that its earlier decisions interpreting land titles have been errone-
ous, refuses, in order to avoid upsetting titles based on those past rulings,
to overturn them retrospectively. See Hanks v. McDonell, 307 Ky. 243,
210 S.W.2d 784 (1948).
10. That there might be such an exception was first suggested by the
Supreme Court in Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134, 139 (U.S. 1847). The
exception was greatly clarified in Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company
v. Debolt, 16 How. 416, 432 (U.S. 1853), and the language there used be-
came the rule in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 206 (U.S.1863)
as follows:
. . . The sound and true rule is, that if the contract, when made,
was valid by the laws of the State as then expounded by all depart-
ments of the government, and administered in its courts of justice,
its validity and obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent action
of legislation, or decision of its courts altering the construction of
the law.
See Snyder, supra note 4 at 130.
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latest view as prospective only." This result was originally based
on the "impairment of contracts" clause,1 2 but it was later stated
that the true purpose behind the exception was to avoid gross
injustice.13 It should be noted, however, that the contract excep-
tion has not been applied when the case has come up on a writ
of error to the state supreme court rather than on appeal from a
lower federal court.'4 Furthermore, it is arguable that at the
present the contract exception can no longer be invoked by the
Court because under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins"5 it no longer has a
choice of state interpretations. Under that case, no matter what
the effect of the latest interpretation is on contracts prior to it, if
11. Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U.S. 60 (1881); Douglass v. County of Pike,
101 U.S. 677 (1879) ; Gelpeke v. City of Dubuque, supra note 10; Rowan v.
Runnels, supra note 10.
12. See language from Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (U.S.
1863) quoted in note 10 supra. See also Snyder, supra note 4, at 133.
13. See Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 452 (1923); Olcott v.
The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678, 690 (U.S. 1872). See also Snyder, supra note
4, at 140.
14. When the case has come up on appeal from a lower federal court,
federal jurisdiction has been based on diversity of citizenship, and in such
cases the Supreme Court has said that the federal courts are free to decide
what the state law is and to enforce it as set forth by the state supreme
court before the contracts were made rather than as set forth in the later
decisions of the same state supreme court. Ibid. But when the case has
come up on writ of error to a state supreme court on the ground that the
state court's retroactive overruling is in violation of the "impairment of
contracts" clause or of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court has consistently denied that it had jurisdiction on those
grounds. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924); Turner v. Wilkes
County Commissioners, 173 U.S. 461 (1899); Bacon v. Texas, 163 U.S. 207
(1895) ; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895); Railroad Com-
pany v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511 (U.S. 1870); see Commercial Bank v. Buck-
ingham, 5 How. 317, 343 (U.S. 1847). The disposition of these constitutional
contentions is well expressed in the following quotations from Central Land
Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895). With reference to the argument based
on impairment of contracts clause, the Court said:
In order to come within the provision of the Constitution of the
United States, which declares that no State shall pass any law impair-
ing the obligation of contracts, not only must the obligation of a con-
tract have been impaired, but it must have been impaired by some act
of the legislative power of the State, and not by a decision of itsjudicial department only.
Id. at 109. To the contention that the state court's action violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court answered:
When the parties have been fully heard in the regular course ofjudicial proceedings, an erroneous decision of a state court does not
deprive the unsuccessful party of his property without due process of
law, within the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. ...
Id. at 112.
15. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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the statute interpreted is constitutional as interpreted, the Su-
preme Court will be obliged to follow it.,6
A court faced with decisions establishing an erroneous inter-
pretation of a statutory or constitutional clause upon which con-
tracts have developed has at least four possible alternatives: (1)
It may refuse to overrule altogether; (2) It may overrule, giving
the decision a retroactive effect; (3) It may overrule in that
particular case but refuse to give the decision a retroactive effect;
and (4) It may hold to the old decisions for determining the case
at bar but in the same decision reverse itself prospectively. The
objection to the first is that it perpetuates bad law, and the ob-
jection to the second has been discussed above. The third is
better but fails to do substantial justice in the case being decided.
The fourth alternative is that which was used in the principal
case, and it appears to be the most desirable since it avoids sur-
prise in the instant case but corrects the error of past decisions.
This last alternative has been used before,17 has been thought to
raise no constitutional issue, s and has been specifically endorsed
by one United States Supreme Court Justice. 9 Its only drawback
is that the prospective statement is only dictum in the particular
case, but this defect is cured when the court later follows its
warning.20
16. In Sunray Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 147 F.2d 962(10th Cir. 1945), the petitioner sought to invoke the principle of such cases
as Gelpeke v. City of Dubuque and Rowan v. Runnels. The court com-
mented on the present pertinency of those cases as follows:
The taxpayer relies on certain earlier decisions where federal courts
chose to follow earlier rather than later decisions of state courts as
correct expositions of state law. In those cases the federal courts
exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases held themselves
free to decide what the state law was, and to enforce it as laid down by
state court decisions handed down before the contracts involved were
made. But that freedom of choice between earlier and later decisions
of state courts no longer obtains since Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins....
Id. at 964.
17. Payne v. City of Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.2d 1045 (1938);
Robinson v. Means, 192 Ark. 816, 95 S.W.2d 98 (1936).
18. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358,
364 (1932). There the Court, in reference to the fact that the Supreme
Court of Montana gave its decision a prospective effect, said:
We think the federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject.
A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a
choice for itself between the principal of forward operation and that
of relation backward. ...
19. See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 US.. 267, 276 (1951) (Mr. Justice Black's
dissent).
20. In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Manion, 193 Ark. 405, 100 S.W.2d 672(1937), the court followed a caveat laid down in Robinson v. Means, 192
Ark. 816, 95 S.W.2d 672 (1937).
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On the basis of this evaluation it is submitted that the court in
the principal case rendered a decision which was consistent with
the demands of substantial justice, while keeping the develop-
ment of the law in step with modern economy.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP-
MULTI-STATE CORPORATION
Plaintiff, a citizen of Massachusetts, sued a multi-state corpora-
tion, incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts, New York,
and New Hampshire, in the Massachusetts Federal District
Court, alleging that defendant was a corporation of New York.1
Defendant pleaded incorporation in Massachusetts, and the court
dismissed the case for want of diversity jurisdiction. On appeal,
held: affirmed. A citizen of one state cannot sue a corporation,
incorporated in that state and another, in the federal courts of
that state on the ground of diversity of citizenship. 2
The citizenship 3 of multi-state corporations, for purposes of
determining diversity jurisdiction, is based on three conclusive
fictitious presumptions applied by the courts:
1) All shareholders of the company are citizens of the state
of incorporation. 4
2) There is a separate and distinct corporation in each state
of incorporation.5
3) The corporation involved in the suit is the separate corpora-
tion of the state where suit is brought.6
Applying these presumptions, the courts find diversity jurisdic-
tion where suit is brought in a state other than that of the in-
dividual party7 (as distinguished from the multi-state corpora-
l. The $3,000 minimum, required for diversity jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1332 (1946), was met.
2. Seavey v. Boston & Maine R.R., 197 F.2d 485 (1st Cir. 1952).
3. Although corporations are not technically citizens under 28 U.S.C.
1332 (1946), the courts refer to the stockholders jointly as the corporation
and speak of the citizenship of the corporation. See McGovney, A Supreme
Court Fiction, 56 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862 (1943).
4. Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444 (1876).
5. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Meeh, 69 Fed. 753 (8th Cir. 1895).
6. Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 81 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936).
7. E.g., Railway Co.-v. Whitton's Administrator, 13 Wall. 270 (1871).
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